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Outside of academia, poetry tends to be 
marginalized as if it were nothing more than the 
textual embodiment of rhetorical flourish and 
emotive expression. Figurative language, or poetic 
essence, is understood as an add-on, or simply one 
way that language can be manipulated, rather than 
as the primary conveyor of linguistic meaning. 
Once the nature of metaphor is understood 
correctly, however, the very idea of truth is 
altered, and the creative aspect of humanity 
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seen in figurative language is recognized as more 
fundamental to meaning, in the most general sense, 
than an objectivist theory of metaphor allows. 
 Because Paul Ricoeur recognized the power 
of metaphor and centered his philosophy on it,1 
his explorations in the search for human meaning 
and hope led him to hermeneutics, which in turn 
led him to metaphor, where linguistic meaning 
is both created and given. Metaphor is where 
the createdness of interpretation collides with 
the reality of the outside world. What follows, 
therefore, explains that interpreting metaphor is 
not merely a matter of understanding a text but 
understanding and perceiving the real world. 
As metaphor is ultimate to speech, so speech is 
ultimate to thought, according to Sallie McFague.2 
Thought, truth, and belief are bound up together 
in the discussion of metaphor, and through this 
discussion poetry manifests its hopefulness and 
prevents humanity from losing itself in an empty 
world. 
Defining Metaphor
 The discussion of metaphor is inherently 
ironic because speaking of metaphor is impossible 
without metaphorical speech; thus, defining 
metaphor is a task with a circular logic before one 
even begins. The difficulty in defining metaphor, 
however, goes even deeper. As Ricoeur points 
out in his second study in The Rule of Metaphor, 
metaphor is treated purely as a rhetorical device 
because of the linguistic emphasis placed upon the 
noun and act of naming in a theory of meaning; that 
is, the singular word has a self-contained meaning. 
Rather than focusing on the word as the source of 
meaning, Ricoeur argues that the sentence is the 
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primary unit of meaning.3 After all, as he quotes 
Emile Benveniste, “A sentence constitutes a whole 
which is not reducible to the sum of its parts; the 
meaning inherent in this whole is distributed over 
the ensemble of the constituents.”4  Words and 
signs do not carry all of their meaning within 
themselves but depend upon context, which is 
why one word can have multiple meanings. That 
is not to say that words carry no meaning in and 
of themselves, but that the sentence should have 
primacy over the word for meaning.5 
 When the word or semiotic order is given 
primacy in meaning, metaphor is reduced to a 
trope or ornament.6 That is, metaphor is nothing 
more than a name for a resemblance or attribution. 
Each particular metaphor is, therefore, a substitute 
for something else. “Billy got into his old Chevy 
truck” is not particularly interesting; “Billy 
mounted his Chevy dinosaur,” however, is a little 
more stimulating. Substitution theory posits that 
metaphor can be replaced by the literal sense 
without a loss in meaning and that understanding 
the metaphor only requires reinstituting the 
substituted term. Therefore, metaphor does 
not introduce anything new, and it is possible 
to comprehensively paraphrase a metaphor.7 A 
metaphor therefore has less significance than 
the tinsel on a Christmas tree or the flowers on 
grandma’s wallpaper. 
 This explanation of metaphor, however, cannot 
account for the differences between everyday 
metaphors and truly novel metaphors. Substitution 
theory ignores the fact that metaphors do bring 
new meaning and imagery that “literal” words do 
not and cannot carry. Substitution theory does 
not explain what makes the non-literal expression 
different from the literal—there is no reason for a 
difference in meaning at the purely semiotic level. 
Words change their meaning at the semantic level, 
with an established context. Without considering 
the semantic level, one cannot understand the 
process of developing metaphorical meaning or 
the reason for a word’s meaning to be extended 
beyond common usage.8  As Ricoeur points out, 
“The dictionary contains no metaphors; they exist 
only in discourse.”9
The Excess of Meaning in Metaphor 
 One area of discourse where metaphor exists 
is poetry. Poetry, at its most basic level, is the 
destruction of ordinary language. The very structure 
of poetry, verse, is anti-grammatical, as it breaks 
up the common sentence. The verse of poetry is 
the “anti-sentence.”10 Like its poetic analogue, the 
metaphor disrupts ordinary language, introducing 
new ideas and concepts that language previously 
did not contain. To use a metaphor is to use words 
in non-ordinary ways, breaking through categories 
in order to form “new logical boundaries on 
the ruins of the preceding ones.”11 For example, 
“Time is the only jury” predicates a physical group 
on an abstract notion, and “the grill coughed 
on the steak” attributes an impossible action to 
an inanimate object. The categories and normal 
understandings are broken; thus, metaphors are 
conceptually deviant and destructive.
 At the same time, however, metaphors reduce 
such deviations. Poetry carries meaning because it 
remains linear even as it breaks up the direction of 
prose; that is, poetry is both verse and prose. The 
deviation that poetic structure creates can only 
exist because of prose, for a deviation can only 
exist if there is a standard from which it deviates 
and to which it calls attention.12 A deviation 
can never be a total separation; if there were no 
relationship whatsoever between the anomaly and 
the norm, then one could not call the anomaly an 
anomaly—it would have no significance to the 
other category. Thus, poetry, even as it deviates 
from prose, simultaneously closes the gap by 
borrowing from prose structures. Without such 
a structure, poetry would be nothing more than 
meaningless words scattered on a page. In the same 
Like its poetic analogue, 
the metaphor disrupts 
ordinary language, 
introducing new ideas 
and concepts that 
language previously did 
not contain.
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way, metaphor reduces deviation even as it deviates 
because it points back to the so-called literal or 
common meaning.13 Therefore, “When we receive 
a metaphorical statement as meaningful, we 
perceive both the literal meaning, which is bound 
by the semantic incongruity, and the new meaning, 
which makes sense in the present context.”14  
 Thus, there is an “is” and an “is not” side to 
metaphor. If one says that football is war, there is 
a sense in which the game of football is war and a 
sense in which it is not war; the predication is not 
total because metaphor does not commit completely 
to one side or the other. The incongruence of the 
categories (war and sports) calls for a new category 
and altered meanings of the game and war. The 
metaphor cannot be identified with any meaning 
in particular because it creates new categories and 
extends meaning because there is always a surplus 
or excess of meaning carried in the differences 
within the new image.15 The new image thus carries 
multiple meanings, and it is within the tension of 
these multiple, previously literal meanings that 
metaphor emerges. The tension of these multiple 
meanings is essential because once they are lost or 
forgotten, the metaphor is absorbed by the literal. 
Ricoeur says that polysemy is what separates 
poetically good metaphors from dead metaphors, or 
metaphors that no longer stimulate new cognitive 
spaces. For example, “foot of the bed” is no longer 
a “good” metaphor because it does not stimulate 
the mind to understand its meaning; rather, its 
meaning is obvious and more immediate because 
it is everyday. A “good” or “living” metaphor, on 
the other hand, would be uncommon, such as “the 
sunlight rubbed roughly against my face.” This 
living metaphor brings together both the literal 
meaning, which is restricted by the deviating 
usage, and the new, figurative meaning, which is 
intelligible only in its semantic context. Metaphor 
is, therefore, a hypostatic union of meaning, wholly 
singular and unique, a term for which there is no 
obvious equivalent.16
 Thus far, the discussion may appear to be 
exceedingly banal and only a matter of making 
a simple thing seem more complex than it is, 
or perhaps it is altogether very unconvincing. 
However, there is a reason for this discussion: 
When one realizes that metaphor functions in 
this way and is not merely an ornament, one can 
understand that metaphor changes our perceptions 
of reality.
Refiguring Reality
 New variables always carry the potential for 
change, and that is what metaphor does. As new 
metaphors are created and used, language changes, 
as words take on meanings that they previously did 
not carry. The polysemy of metaphor is not just 
synchronic but also diachronic—metaphor does 
not just carry multiple meanings at the same time 
but builds on and compounds past meanings into 
the new ones. For example, “inflation is burning 
a hole in my pocket” is a metaphor built upon a 
dead metaphor. “Inflation” is a dead metaphor, 
having been absorbed by literal language, which 
is apparent in the fact that the reader understood 
that inflation refers to the general increase in prices 
or the devaluing of money and not filling a balloon 
with air. More about this will be demonstrated 
below, but for now it is important to see that 
metaphors build on each other, and it is through 
this process of creation and then absorption into 
literal language that language changes. If metaphor 
is the process by which language changes, then 
metaphor cannot be just a rhetorical device but 
is actually the process by which people make 
connections and see similarities between ideas, 
The polysemy of 
metaphor is not just 
synchronic but also 
diachronic—metaphor 
does not just carry 
multiple meanings at 
the same time but builds 
on and compounds past 
meanings into the new 
ones.
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thus adding meaning to words and phrases.17 
 As metaphor breaks the categories of language 
structures, it also breaks the structures of reality. 
Language is essential to thought, and if language 
about reality is modified, then perceptions of 
reality are equally modified. Thus, metaphor 
changes how people understand the world, and in 
so doing, it refigures the world, for reality is, in a 
very large part, what people make of it.18 Reality is 
not simply “out there” but must be interpreted.19 
As people appropriate metaphors, how they view 
or interpret reality is altered, priorities are changed, 
and different actions are taken. Such appropriation 
of metaphors explains why television affects human 
behavior. The refiguring power of metaphor is the 
reason stories, traditions, and  people influence 
other people’s behavior. Ricoeur focuses on 
metaphor’s power in biblical parables: 
In a parable the fiction brings about this 
epoche that wipes out what I am calling the 
first-order descriptive reference in favor of the 
metaphorical reference that works here as a 
model does for scientific understanding. In 
saying this, I am really doing nothing more 
than rejuvenating Aristotle’s analysis in his 
Poetics. Poetry is mimetic because it is mythic. 
It mimics reality because it becomes a plot. 
In the same way, the parable redescribes life 
through the fiction of its story.20 
 As these re-descriptions obviously have 
influenced and continue to influence how millions 
of people understand their lives, it is clear that 
fiction and poetry are much more than just emotive 
figments of imagination; they are fundamental to 
the structures of conceptual thought. In fact, the 
emotive element of poetry is what gives poetry a 
strong, although often ambiguous, reference to 
the world that non-poetic language does not, for 
emotions are a vital mode of humanity’s relationship 
with the world. Poetry and imagination are just as 
referentially connected  to reality as is descriptive 
or “literal” language—this is apparent, however, 
only when one tosses out the reductionistic view of 
meaning, reality, and language that does not grasp 
their inherent interrelations. As Ricoeur points out, 
descriptive language is anything but exhaustive of 
human experience.21 Nevertheless, we need clear 
examples of how metaphor functions in language 
and affects conceptualization. 
The Inherent Metaphoricity of Language
 The claim that metaphors are fundamental to 
language and change reality might seem ridiculous 
because metaphor is embedded deep within the 
structure of language itself. Metaphor is so inherent 
that one cannot see it any more easily than a person 
can see her own eye. Indeed, metaphor must be 
used to identify metaphor, and even then not 
without the aid of careful reflection.
 In the book Metaphors We Live By, authors 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson set out to 
demonstrate how essential metaphor is to the way 
people understand their language and experience. 
They begin with the concept that “argument is 
war.” This metaphor serves as the fundamental 
source of many metaphors that are used every 
day.22 For example, “His claims are indefensible,” 
“I lost the argument,” “His criticism is on target,” 
“The weak point of the argument,” and “He shot 
down my protests” all point to the idea that an 
argument is war. From this, “It is important to see 
that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms 
of war. We can actually win or lose arguments”23  
Thus, 
The metaphor is not merely in the words we 
use—it is in our very concept of an argument. 
The language of argument is not poetic, 
fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal. We talk 
about arguments that way because we conceive 
of them that way—and we act according to 
the way we conceive of things.24
 To understand the impact of such a metaphor, 
Lakoff and Johnson ask the reader to “Imagine a 
culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the 
participants are seen as performers, and the goal is 
to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing 
way.”25 As an outsider to this culture, one would 
not understand people to be arguing but would 
understand them as doing something else. Calling 
such an activity an “argument” would break all the 
definitions and concepts surrounding the actions 
involved in an argument because the structure of 
their discourse would operate on entirely different 
premises. 
 Perhaps even more fundamental is the 
metaphorical nature of language about language; 
for example, ideas are conceived of as objects (e.g. 
“I gave him the idea.”), linguistic expressions are 
understood as containers (e.g. “That sentence has 
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no profundity,” “His words rang hollow,” or “One 
cannot stuff so many ideas into one lecture,”), and 
communication is structured by the notion of 
sending (e.g. “We got the message across to him,” 
or “Your thoughts came through to me.”). 26 Once 
one sees the metaphorical nature of language, 
it becomes clear that all prepositions fit into 
these categories, as they often describe a relative 
position of two non-physical “entities” as they are 
metaphorically conceived. 
 As metaphors embody concepts such as those 
given above, they not only give meaning  but also 
hide meaning; there is both an “is” and an “is not” 
side to metaphor. Metaphorical structure, in other 
words, is only partial, not total; otherwise,  one 
idea would be equivalent to another. Metaphors 
are meant to highlight one aspect and are in this 
way unable to be replaced easily. To use Lakoff and 
Johnson’s example, “time is money” emphasizes the 
point that time spent cannot be regained, for one 
cannot exchange time at a bank like money.27 Part 
of the metaphor does not fit, but that part of the 
metaphor is “hidden” in that the ability of money 
to be returned is not considered. This selectivity 
of metaphor causes people to conceptualize and 
recall very specific things when using or hearing 
metaphors. 
  Because a given metaphor cannot totalize 
a given concept, one must often use  several 
metaphors simultaneously to highlight different 
concepts. For example, “The content of the 
argument proceeds thusly” conceptualizes an 
argument in terms of a container and a journey.28 
The “argument is war” metaphor is not enough 
to completely conceptualize what an argument is. 
Argument is a journey, argument is a container, and 
argument is a building are all metaphors that can be 
used to convey different aspects of “argument” that 
need to be highlighted at a given moment.29 Thus, 
one often sees a mixture of metaphors, like “So 
far we have constructed the core of our argument,” 
highlighting the journey, building, and content 
metaphors together.30
 Again, what is apparent here is that metaphor 
is the means by which people conceptualize. Like 
any given word, a metaphor retains its distinctive 
positive definition in its differences from other 
concepts or words. The difference between a meta-
phor and another word is that metaphor breaks 
through the commonly established boundaries 
found in “bare” words by impertinent semantical 
usage. What separates the figurative from the 
literal? It would seem that the commonality 
of the usage does, for it is only when “leg of a 
chair” becomes common that it loses its figurative 
sense. However, many, if not most, conventional 
metaphors, like the “argument is war” metaphor, 
do not fit into the “dead” metaphor category. 
Systematic metaphorical expressions that seem to 
make conceptualization possible are far from being 
dead metaphors, even though they are common.31 
Indeed, systematic metaphors extend beyond 
everyday conversation and conceptualization to 
even affect how people do things in all areas, even 
in the supposedly literal field of science.32
Metaphorical Structures and Theory
 Although  scientists and intellectuals of a 
similar type  often express the most skepticism 
toward the value of poetry and the imagination in 
the humanitarian sciences, one could easily argue 
that  scientists are the ones who use metaphor more 
than anyone else. Scientific fields regularly must 
make use of models to explain phenomena.33 Some 
models are merely pedagogical, while other models 
are paradigmatic; that is, they are the only way in 
which an idea can be expressed.34 For example, 
light is described as both particles and waves, both 
of which are metaphors highlighting one aspect of 
light, and neither of which describes what light is 
in itself or literally. Without such models, nothing 
about light could be said at all.35 However, such 
metaphors are but the product of much larger 
metaphorical paradigms. One of these paradigms, 
Newtonian physics, conceptualizes the world in 
deterministic, mechanistic terms: the world is a 
machine that has set operations, either moving 
cyclically or remaining static altogether—not 
moving  in a linear direction. Evolutionary theory, 
however, changed this concept in that it recognizes 
change and development as more accurate ways to 
characterize reality.36 Because reality changes and 
is not a static substance, things become relative to 
new situations at different times. Thus, 
instead of “particles of matter existing in 
an absolute framework of space and time,” 
relativity informs us that there are no absolute 
measurements possible and quantum physics 
informs us that the ultimate particles are not 
“substances” as Newton supposed, but receding 
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pulses of energy so elusive that all we can say 
about them is that sometimes they behave like 
“waves” and sometimes like “particles.”37
 Evolutionary theory, and even more so the 
theory of relativity, reflects the realization that 
the scientist is not a purely objective observer 
of unchanging processes and substances but a 
participant in a larger framework of movement 
and measurement. All attempts to measure motion 
are relative because time is not simultaneous at all 
points in space and because the act of taking any 
measurement influences the thing being measured, 
hence  Einstein’s theory of relativity. 38
 Here one sees that the scientific metaphor 
that conceptualizes how people approach reality 
has changed. The universe is no longer viewed as 
a collection of substance that mechanistically operates 
according to rigid rules. Rather, the universe is 
understood as a fundamentally relative or relational 
process that moves in ambiguous or loose directions.39 
Words like these represent different paradigms 
that serve to illuminate or emphasize one or more 
aspects of reality but never the totality. One who 
emphasizes the organic, progressive nature of the 
world will naturally interpret how things work 
and thus will seek solutions in different ways from 
one who conceives of the world as mechanistic or 
cyclical. Therefore, even the most “objective” of 
sciences finds itself dependent upon metaphor to 
understand what it is studying. 
 To take one more example, imagine 
understanding problems primarily in terms of 
chemistry rather than as a puzzle. If problems were 
chemicals, “All of your problems are always present, 
only they may be dissolved and in solution, or they 
may be in solid form. The best you can hope for 
is to find a catalyst that will make one problem 
dissolve without making another one precipitate 
out.”40 Thus, “to live by the chemical metaphor 
would be to accept it as a fact that no problem 
ever disappears forever. Rather than direct your 
energies toward solving your problems once and 
for all, you would direct your energies toward 
finding out what catalysts will dissolve your most 
pressing problems for the longest time without 
precipitating out worse ones.”41
 The puzzle metaphor, on the other hand, sees 
an end to the problems. As people go on living, 
they are constantly trying to find solutions via this 
metaphor, where they have hope for a permanent 
fix.42 This  attitude toward problems is mostly 
unconscious—people do not stop and consider the 
means by which they associate and conceptualize 
something as vague as a “problem.” It is in this 
enabling and structuring conceptualization that 
metaphor has the power to recreate reality. 
 The question that remains, then, if metaphor 
is so fundamental to thinking and is yet biased, is, 
How can truth be obtained?
Metaphorical Truth: Implications and 
Applications
 If metaphor carries multiple meanings 
and never describes anything in total,  how can 
one know anything? This question leads to the 
perennial problem of objectivity and subjectivity in 
knowing. To what extent is knowledge subjective, 
and how can objective knowledge be obtained? As 
was said earlier, the view that metaphor is just an 
ornament of language presupposes an objectivist 
view of reality—that is, “that what is real is wholly 
external to, and independent of, how human 
beings conceptualize the world.”43 
What has been shown 
here, however, is 
that reality, which is 
indeed known through 
the processes of 
conceptualization, is 
dependent on metaphor. 
People depend upon 
poetic associations 
and connections to be 
creative and understand 
the world as a coherent 
whole.
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 What has been shown here, however, is 
that reality, which is indeed known through the 
processes of conceptualization, is dependent on 
metaphor. People depend upon poetic associations 
and connections to be creative and understand the 
world as a coherent whole. Without the ability to 
merge categories and find links, the world would 
be incomprehensible. How does one know if the 
connections one is making are not in fact pulling 
one further out to sea? The fear of losing the direct, 
unfiltered access to the world “as it really is” seems 
to be natural, for most. 44 Rather than shy away 
from the ambiguity and polysemy of metaphor 
and subjective experience, one should mine 
these characteristics  for the important clues they 
carry about how humans create and appropriate 
meaning.
 Meaning in language cannot be univocal, for 
without polysemy—both the diachronic change in 
meaning and the synchronic possession of multiple 
meanings—language would extend infinitely, and 
some things could never be expressed. As Ricoeur 
says, “A language without polysemy would violate 
the principle of economy, for it would extend its 
vocabulary infinitely. Furthermore, it would violate 
the rule of communication, because it would 
multiply its designations as often as, in principle, 
the diversity of human experience and the plurality 
of subjects of experience demanded.”45 In other 
words, nothing could ever be communicated to 
someone else because every moment-by-moment 
experience for each person would have a unique 
meaning and thus a completely unique (and 
new) word or linguistic expression for it. Because 
another would not have the same conceptions and 
understandings (because no one ever thinks about 
anything in precisely the same way), any expression 
other than one’s own would be unintelligible. 
Thus,
we need a lexical system that is economical, 
flexible, and sensitive to context, in order to 
express the spectrum of human experience. 
It is the task of contexts to sift the variations 
of appropriate meanings and, with the help 
of polysemic words, to devise discourse that 
is seen as relatively univocal—that is, giving 
rise to just one interpretation, that which the 
speaker intended to bestow on his words.46
The polysemy of metaphor is thus the means by 
which people are able to understand each other, 
although not comprehensively.
 These differences in meaning from one 
person to the next are often extremely subtle, and 
because meaning is somewhat relative, accurately 
measuring these differences and where they lie 
is impossible. However, these alterations can 
be partially illustrated by the non-equivalence 
of paraphrase. Lakoff and Johnson argue that 
people conceptualize sentences metaphorically 
in spatial terms, which affects how they perceive 
the relationship between form and content.47 As 
an example, they explain that cultures orient their 
concepts based upon a “canonical person” as the 
central reference point: 
Since people typically function in an upright 
position, see and move frontward, spend most 
of their time performing actions, and view 
themselves as being basically good, we have a 
basis in our experience for viewing ourselves 
as more UP than DOWN, more FRONT 
than BACK, more ACTIVE than PASSIVE, 
more GOOD than BAD. Since we are where 
we are and exist in the present, we conceive of 
ourselves as being HERE rather than THERE, 
and NOW rather than THEN.48
 Thus, up, front, active, good, here, and now are 
oriented toward the canonical person while down, 
back, passive, bad, there, and then are oriented 
away from that person. This order corresponds to 
the fact that in English it is more normal to say, 
“up and down” than “down and up,” “good and 
bad” than “bad and good,” and “now and then” 
than “then and now.” The main principle is this: 
“Relative to the properties of the prototypical 
person, the word whose meaning is NEAREST 
comes FIRST.”49 This spatial metaphor is but one 
example of the inherency of metaphors to our 
conceptual systems:
While some aspects of the meaning of a 
sentence are consequences of certain relatively 
arbitrary conventions of the language, other 
aspects of meaning arise by virtue of our 
natural attempt to make what we say coherent 
with our conceptual system. This includes the 
form that we say things in, since that form is 
conceptualized in spatial terms.50 
Thus, even a paraphrase will have a different 
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meaning, albeit often subtle, since paraphrases 
always involve abbreviation and structure changes, 
highlighting different aspects and reflecting 
different orientations of different conceptual 
systems in the changing of word order and 
adoption of synonyms.
 It does not follow, therefore, that understanding 
something requires objectively descriptive language 
or language that has unmediated reference to 
reality. Objectivism or logical positivism argues 
that language which is not descriptive—that is, 
giving pure information about something—is 
necessarily emotional or purely within the subject, 
isolated from anything external to the subject.51 
This dichotomy of the object and the subject, and 
its conclusion that poetic language has no reference 
or relation to reality, is unwarranted: “At stake in 
this explication is nothing less than the meaning of 
the words reality and truth.”52 
 What must first be modified is one’s 
understanding of language and reality. If one cuts 
language off from reality, as a third entity, merely 
describing but not involved in and affecting what 
the world is, then language becomes ultimately 
irrelevant and unnecessary for thought. However, 
language is necessary for thought—it is impossible 
to think without using language. If this is the 
case, then language does not exist purely for itself 
but because of and only in reference to the world 
which is opened up to the mind. Ricoeur says, “If 
language does not exist for itself, but in view of 
the world that it opens up and uncovers, then the 
interpretation of language is not distinct from the 
interpretation of the world.”53
 When one believes metaphor to be central 
to language and thus to thought, how one  finds 
truth is structured by the character of metaphor, 
that is, the tension of the “is” and “is not.” One 
can no longer deny the situated and relational 
character of truth, which is always perceived, 
but it is yet perceived only in part; the remaining 
part is therefore filled by the human imagination. 
Ricoeur says that “as the conjunction of fiction 
and redescription suggests, poetic feeling itself 
also develops an experience of reality in which 
invention and discovery cease being opposed and 
where creation and revelation coincide.”54 Truth 
therefore is paradoxical; the only way to speak 
of it is dialectically because to pin down a theory 
of truth and how truth is attained assumes an 
objectivist, literalist meaning. Metaphor depends 
upon the literal for meaning but at the same time 
makes the literal impossible. 55
 Lakoff and Johnson clearly demonstrate that 
even as metaphor influences perceptions and 
actions, metaphors are often structured according 
to reality or human experience. In other words, 
a constant tension exists between the world as 
it forces itself on perceptions and perception as 
it forces itself on the world.56  Thus, even as the 
myth of objectivism is to be rejected, so also 
must the myth of subjectivism. The third choice, 
if it can be identified, is not as simple but more 
true.57  The third view is really a view in process 
of being explained, and perhaps it will always be 
in process of being explained. Since the beginning 
of philosophy, no one has been able to attain the 
What must first be 
modified is one’s 
understanding of 
language and reality. 
If one cuts language 
off from reality, as a 
third entity, merely 
describing but not 
involved in and affecting 
what the world is, 
then language becomes 
ultimately irrelevant and 
unnecessary for thought. 
However, language is 
necessary for thought—
it is impossible to think 
without using language.
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“middle” between an objectivist account and a 
subjectivist account of knowing. There seems to be 
no true Hegelian synthesis of this problem. Lakoff 
and Johnson find the third, experientialist option 
in metaphor, which is an “imaginative rationality,” 
for metaphor involves categories, entailments, and 
inference as well as seeing things in different and 
new ways:58 “[T]ruth is always given relative to a 
conceptual system and the metaphors that structure 
it. Truth is therefore not absolute or objective but 
is based on understanding. Thus sentences do not 
have inherent, objectively given meanings, and 
communication cannot be merely the transmission 
of such meanings.” 59 It would be well to remember 
that “A sentence can’t mean anything to you unless 
you understand it [;] meaning is always meaning 
to someone. There is no such thing as a meaning 
of a sentence in itself, independent of any people. 
When we speak of the meaning of a sentence, it is 
always the meaning of the sentence to someone, a 
real person or a hypothetical typical member of a 
speech community.”60
 Truth and meaning are thus inherently rela-
tional and dependent on subjective understanding 
but are  grounded in a physical reality. To be 
enveloped in language is not like being trapped in 
a prison or cut off from reality. As Terry Eagleton 
says, “To be inside a language is to be pitched 
into the world, not to be quarantined from it.”61 
Thinking of language as separate from reality and 
not involved directly in what reality is in itself, 
so to speak, assumes the objectivist stance that 
the world can be observed and kept at a distance. 
Language, even as it colors interpretation, grounds 
interpretation, as it is simultaneously part of the 
referent that it refers to. Even as reality is not inert, 
so metaphor and language are not inert. 
Ontological Reevaluation and Meaning
 The metaphorical tension of the “is” and 
“is not” therefore changes how the world is 
understood. After all, as Vanhoozer asks, “Can 
one create metaphors without believing them 
and without believing that, in a certain way, ‘that 
is’?”62 Metaphorical truth calls for a new ontology, 
one that calls for a “being-as” that corresponds 
to the act of “seeing-as” of metaphor.63 Rather 
than understanding only the actualized world 
as what is real, metaphor sees the world of 
potential as being actualized as well, enlarging 
our vision by expanding beyond what is real to 
include the possible.64 A modern ontology, such 
as that provided by Kant, could not have faith in 
possibilities but could only perceive the actual. 
In an objectivist ontology, the empirical is that 
which is real, and the imagination cannot have 
any role at all without denying knowledge. This 
understanding is possible, of course, only because 
sense-information (e.g. sight, smell, touch, etc.) 
is thought to be uninterpreted and language 
peripheral to understanding. When language, 
imagination, and metaphor are understood as 
central to the world itself, however, knowledge 
and truth are still possible in the presence of faith, 
opening up the possibility of hope for the future.65 
 With an ontology of reality in which 
metaphor and man are so tightly bound, self-
understanding, and thus meaning, must come 
through the mediation of language.66 How can 
this meaning be found, and what meaning is 
there for mankind? Knowledge is found through 
hermeneutical reflection. As Vanhoozer explains, 
“We cannot ‘see’ ourselves directly; rather, we 
must ‘read’ ourselves by interpreting what we say 
and do.”67 It is in this self-reflection that poetry 
becomes essential, because it is the task of the poet 
to express the human condition by struggling and 
working with language. 68 It is through the poetic 
imagination that people are able not only to reflect 
on themselves and make sense of the world but 
also find hope for the future. It is this hope for the 
Thinking of language 
as separate from reality 
and not involved 
directly in what reality 
is in itself, so to speak, 
assumes the objectivist 
stance that the world 
can be observed and 
kept at a distance.
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future, something that exists only in possibility 
and imagination, that gives humanity purpose and 
meaning.69  As Vanhoozer says, 
Literal or descriptive language alone ultimately 
diminishes human being because it is unable 
to articulate those fundamental values that 
orient our lives. In sum, scientific and literal 
language fail to serve humanity because they 
are unable to express the possible. Bereft of 
this access to the possible, humanity loses its 
passion and must resign itself either to the 
actual or to the necessary, to “what is” or “what 
must be”—not to “what might be.”70
 As poetry provides a means to hope, one 
should not dismiss poetry and the imaginative 
aspect of humanity as trivial or false but embrace 
it as it is fundamental to human being. Poetry gives 
meaning to human life and is inherent in God’s 
creation. It is not for nothing that the Scriptures 
contain poetry as well as histories and epistles. 
Indeed, all religious language, including Scripture, 
is inherently poetic as it deviates from ordinary 
language, opens up a new world to readers, and 
causes readers to understand themselves in a 
new way in light of the text.71 Poetry is inherent 
not merely to meaning but to the possibility of 
knowing God.72 
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